**Good decision-making in the field of business. A discussion of the challenges to and opportunities offered by public religious education in this connection.**

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*Abstract*

*Public theology is by self-definition and according to general expectations supposed to contribute to the debate on social issues. But reality shows that there is a limit when it comes to putting theological ideas into practice. This text discusses the challenges and opportunities with reference to the example of ‘good’ decision-making in an attempt to define the specific function of public religious education in this context.*

1. Introduction

Although it might seem unprofessional, I believe it will be helpful to begin by narrating one of my own personal experiences. At a recent meeting I was asked the following question: “Here in Frankfurt, the BREXIT vote has raised major issues. Over past years, the city of Frankfurt has contributed significant sums towards the support of endangered regional businesses. Now that it seems to be very likely that the stock market here might become more influential because it is possible that the London market will shrink, there are voices that are demanding that the money should be invested in the stock market instead. Could you please judge the situation from a *theological* point of view?”

My first and spontaneous answer would have been: “That is an inappropriate question because it relates to a wholly financial aspect which, as such, is not our concern.” Present at this meeting there was a mix of theologians, lawyers and businessmen and more or less all of them seemed to respond positively to the question. Consequently I kept my first thoughts to myself and tried instead to skate around the issue.

This question might at first appear to be somewhat uninspiring but I subsequently realized it was ideal for illustrating some of the essential misunderstandings and challenges that public theology is currently facing.

2. The challenges currently faced by public theology

The situation described above demonstrates what is a common assumption; namely that religion is perceived as an arbitrator of what is ’good’ or ‘bad’ or rather ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. And it is also remarkable that theologians are expected not only to judge on theological but also on business (and other everyday) matters that are outside their explicit scope of responsibilities. And it is similarly surprising that most representatives of religion and theology seem not to mind being asked to assume this role.

However, in the given situation I did not know how to comment on an economic dilemma like this from the theological point of view. There was not just the difficulty of having to assess a foreign policy–related aspect from a theological perspective but, on top of this, also the problem that it seemed I was expected to provide a quite concrete and practical solution to this quandary. I was being asked to make a decision or weigh up a decision that was to be taken by financiers and business people and give preference to the one option or the other.

The third challenge facing public theology that is exemplified by the given example became apparent when I responded. Although I made reference to very basic and widely known Christian doctrines using what I would consider everyday language I could see that my audience could not understand what I was talking about or – what was even worse – they mistook what I was saying because they had their own, individual perceptions of what Christian theology is supposed to be.

In view of the alternatives – allow businesses to collapse in favour of investing in the more promising stock market or continue to subsidise existing jobs – I came to the following conclusion. There is no way I could offer a direct solution to the problem because I neither have the required microeconomic expertise nor is there a genuinely suitable theological resolution. As a consequence, I decided to analyse the problem using aspects of Christian religion that have an indirect and a very general bearing on the situation. For that purpose I chose to base my answer on the doctrine of justification, which places value on the relationship of every individual with God and subsequently brings with it particular freedoms as well as responsibilities. I could, of course, have equally chosen to allude to other aspects of Christian doctrine. Using the doctrine I had selected as starting point and trying to at least derive some more pragmatic conclusions, I argued that due to the granted justification, it is possible to free oneself from secularly imposed ‘musts’ (such as the need to evaluate the options with regard to rational and economic constraints) and decide in favour of the less promising businesses and assume thereby responsibility for the employees. Facing an audience that seemed dissatisfied with this answer I added that, on the other hand, you could opt for the stock market alternative and give comfort to the losers in this situation by underscoring their unimpaired value as human beings despite the loss of their jobs.

Obviously in the end the answer came down to a choice between two options that differed in terms of their consequences. So you had either to accept that there are certain intrinsic religious ethical and moral standards and make the decision on the basis of those standards or, alternatively, provide compensation and solace if you conclude that economic and rational criteria should be allowed to be the decisive factors. Neither option can be considered to be satisfying or in accordance with the concepts underlying Christian theology. It is apparent that there is a gulf between what is expected of public theology and in how far the discipline is able to meet those expectations.

3. The problems associated with public theology

I am aware of the fact that my answer as it is described above was no better than the underlying question and what I am making out of this experience here can be considered a somewhat polemic and ironic attempt to show how public theology *can* be perceived when it comes to applying theological concepts to real life situations. Even so, to a certain extent it does reflect genuine systematic patterns of exchange between those working in the field of public theology and representatives of other areas in the real world.

But what is it that is preventing public theology from fulfilling existing needs in a more appropriate way and what would need to be changed to achieve this? Note that the following aspects are not primarily relevant to a discussion of the academic literature on public theology itself but rather are intended to deal with the question of how public theology is perceived and applied in real life contexts.[[1]](#footnote-2) At the same time, we need to bear in mind that – at least to a certain extent – the (academic) literature on public theology claims to contribute to the solution of everyday problems.

1. As the above example shows, public theology, as an aspect of academic theology, seems to be in some respect too self-referential. Consider the fact that trivial but concrete real life matters are very rarely focused upon. Instead, entirely theological topics are discussed in isolation and only afterwards are relevant findings applied to different contexts – if at all. An approach of this kind need not necessarily be unproductive but it is possible that the situation in which public theology finds itself is by intention as described. Perhaps there are certain reservations when it comes to real life challenges and public theology is deliberately keeping itself aloof from direct involvement in fundamental public concerns, placing these last on its list.

Taking into consideration all that has been said so far, it can certainly be argued that it makes sense to restrict theology to theoretical and purely theological reflection on genuinely theological matters – at least to some extent.[[2]](#footnote-3) What to make of the result of these reflections should in this case be left to the relevant addressees.

1. To be fair, public theologians are not purely self-referential; instead they are in a constant dialogue with politicians and thus play a role in the general governance system. But when it comes to realising the given advice and communicating the relevant contributions, public theology is largely excluded from the process. As a consequence, there is quite often an enormous divide between the intention and the real outcome. Here is perhaps another problem: public theology is only part of the process at the very beginning when issues are identified and discussed. Subsequent practical implementation is undertaken by the established institutions without any further input by public theology.
2. Unfortunately, this failure to contribute towards implementation is not the only challenge being faced by public theology. To be frank, the problems begin at an even earlier point in time. For it is the theological perception of social issues itself that is too narrow and biased – and this is the third problem we need to deal with. The way public theology perceives ‘the world outside public theology’ could be described as a biased top-down process instead of an open bottom-up approach. This means that certain issues that are of major relevance (at least to the public) are extensively ignored by (academic) theology in the first instance, while theology itself withdraws into a self-spun cocoon of ‘knowing better’ instead of actively becoming involved in dealing with these issues.

It is true that there is an increasing perception of the importance of educational aspects that could make a difference in this context, but this factor has remained marginal to date. Hence, some of the fundamental insights of religious education might contribute to dealing with the described problems (see below: 5. Religious education as a ‘missing link’).

4. Initial conclusions

Despite all my reservations, I am increasingly coming round to the realisation that supposedly ‘inappropriate questions’ like the one I cite above are legitimate and should be taken seriously – even if we cannot respond in a way that conforms to expectations (e.g. by choosing one option over another).

And as a matter of fact, decisions and decision-making are not only essential to business but are similarly core aspects of Christian theology. ‘Decision-making’ as a category is both a central concept of dialectical theology and impinges on basic aspects of Christian theology, for example Christian anthropology and the discussion of the individual freedom that is granted through the human relationship with God.

Therefore public religious education as the linking element between public theology and ‘the public’ has in this particular case the task of finding ways in which theological perspectives on decisions and decision-making can be transferred into the business world and thus help when it comes to making difficult decisions in such dilemma situations. Public religious education can be distinguished from religious education in that the former is a discipline that represents a broader outlook and does not focus exclusively on school and educational matters but is intended to provide more concrete recommendations with regard to social issues. In this sense, public religious education can therefore be defined as the ‘missing link’ between public theology and society/'the public'.

If public religious education is not to function as a purely conceptual discipline designed only to provide didactic guidelines, then it becomes necessary to undertake an extensive analysis of the category ‘decision-making’ as this applies both in Christian theology and the world of business, the aim being to find some kind of common ground where an effective and sustainable exchange can take place and productive learning situations can be generated. The particular role of public religious education would therefore go far beyond acting merely as a mediator helping others, thanks to its insight into theological matters, and would understand and interpret theological ideas. What is more, religious education in this form fails to exploit the opportunities available to the discipline while misconstruing the discipline itself; a strictly top-down structure at the expense of a bottom-up process would be preserved that would seriously neglect the conditions and circumstances of the addressees of public theology. For what is still absent to date is a deeper understanding of the particular target group with regard to those conditions that configure the whole process of exchange. It is significant that public theology virtually lacks any empirical basis.

We shall thus here subsequently consider the empirical basis of decision-making itself. Furthermore we need to determine how the factors ‘decision’, ‘decision-making’ and ‘decision-maker’ are perceived in business contexts and identify situations in which public theology can contribute to *good* decision-making and religious education might be able to provide support when it comes to decision-making. In addition, the intention is to provide an example of how public theology and (public) religious education could cooperate in the face of social challenges and demands in general.

5. Empirical views of decision-making in the business environment

It is apparent, on the one hand, that there is a growing demand for criteria that will enable good decision-making within the world of business. And there is no doubt that public theology could act as a suitable collaborator here. On the other hand, there is the problem that business procedures are determined by rational economic parameters while the commercial world is strictly organised in line with appropriate business working practices (consider for instance that almost any process is shaped by operationalisation and standardisation). In consequence the advice and input offered by public theology are of little direct relevance to businesses.

In order to identify constituent differences, it is helpful to outline some of the main ideas and key findings on decision theory and personal decision-making as they are perceived within the discipline of economics and business theory.

When it had become clear in the early 1960s that decisions are also obviously made on the basis of reasons that are not necessarily rational, Rational Choice Theory began to lose ground. It turned out that the so-called ‘homo economicus’ was merely a hypothetical being and did not enjoy a real existence. As a result, the question arose: what parameters determine decision-making if not rational factors?

As the first major change in research on decision-making, focus was placed on the process of deciding rather than on the outcome. It became clear that decision-making is to a large extent not a conscious process as it is determined by the underlying operating mode of the brain which is designed to reduce the cognitive effort. In 1979, Nobel Prize winners Kahnemann and Tversky proposed their Prospect Theory[[3]](#footnote-4) which demonstrated “that the processes of intuitive judgement were not merely simpler than rational models demanded, but were categorically different in kind” (Gilovich, Griffin & Kahnemann, 2002, p. 3). Kahnemann and Tversky based their theory on a limited set of heuristics and biases that they claimed determine all forms of decision-making.[[4]](#footnote-5)

Kahnemann and Tversky identified particular patterns of heuristics and a set of corresponding biases as well as a systematic group of preferences that are influenced and designed by personal experience. It should be born in mind that the term ‘biased’ in this context means choosing the solution that offers greatest subjective utility.[[5]](#footnote-6)

In view of the fact that it is not possible to fully develop the topic here because of the necessary limitations of this article, in the following I concentrate on three heuristic principles[[6]](#footnote-7) that have a major influence on the process of decision-making. The *representativeness heuristic* represents a strategy employed by the human brain in which similarities are identified in order to define in which already existing category any perceived object is to be placed. This heuristic helps ascertain the probability of occurrence of a consequence of a decision whereby the main criterion for individual decision-making is in how far the perceived corresponds to existing individually shaped stereotypes. The *availability heuristic* also relates to the probability of occurrence. But in contrast to the representativeness heuristic it is in this case availability of information that determines the individual view of the perceived object. Finally, in the case of the *anchoring heuristic*, people begin by setting reference points and calculate probabilities taking these as starting points.

It is obvious that processing information in the described way will lead to systematic errors and misjudgements because such a simplification and reduction of complexity cannot accurately reproduce the actual situation in specific individual circumstances. This is why the process of decision-making is systematically biased; there is a tendency to create compatibility and avoid dissonance between incoming stimuli and the corresponding reaction. It is not necessary to discuss the different kinds of biases here. Instead it is worth considering the common ground shared by all biases when it comes to factors that trigger systematic errors. It is the human need for consistency and self-assertion that underlies all systematic patterns of biased information processing.

But what is the effect of the described insights and additional information when it comes to the empirical nature of making decisions? And in how far could public theology or public religious education play a role here and contribute towards good decision-making? To put it another way; how can the relatively young discipline of public religious education act as the link that is currently missing?

6. Public religious education as the ‘missing link’

Among the various theological disciplines, religious education can be seen as the champion of the factual realities of life. This means that one key task is to analyse – both critically and empirically – the social relevance and impact of the ideas of (public) theology. Moreover, public religious education is supposed to mediate on equal terms between theological reflections upon reality and individual realities. And finally it is faced with the challenge of conveying theological information in a form that suits the specific target group.

With regard to good decision-making, religious education therefore needs to analyse how religions and religious beliefs interact with the systematic mechanisms of decision-making as expounded by empirical research and described above.

As a first consequence, public theology must accept that theological reflections upon morals and ethics and how these pertain to making ‘good’ or ‘right’ decisions cannot be directly conveyed. And this also holds true for the more feasible practical concepts that are derived from theological theory. The acceptance of such a view – simple as it is – would already represent a revolutionary turnaround for existing public theological approaches for it makes it clear that the ‘simple’ insight into what is/would be ‘right’ does not necessarily result in good decision-making.

Initially, it seems tempting to simply duplicate the efforts of empirical research and determine if, for example, there are heuristics or biases in the case of the contents or functions of religion and religious beliefs. That would undoubtedly be a challenging and interesting task. But, at the same time, results of research of this kind would probably remain essentially vague and would hardly meet the strictures of formal behaviouristic research.

However, the main stumbling block to research of this kind is the fact that the kind of behaviouristic research design used in the case of the Prospect Theory would not be suitable for various reasons. To avoid misunderstandings here, I accept that it was more than appropriate to the research undertaken by Kahnemann and Tversky and I would like to stress I am in no way attempting to discredit their findings. What is more, it almost perfectly conforms to the expectations and suits the culture of economics and business, where the results of research are treated as the required guidelines assumed to be applicable in various contexts.[[7]](#footnote-8) At the same time, I consider that public theology/public religious education should not adopt this research approach or the stated results overhastily in the belief that an empirical basis of this kind would provide a whole new dimension for the communication of theological ideas in everyday contexts. I hold this view for basically two reasons: a) the behaviouristic view of the individual that is postulated by the relevant research contradicts – at least to a certain extent – Christian theological anthropology and b) a couple of less obvious conclusions (with major repercussions) with regard to the individual can be drawn on the basis of the research undertaken by Kahnemann and Tversky that do not coincide with business theory and that contrast with theological views of decision-making and the individual decision-maker. From the point of view of theology, a ‘good’ decision can only be made on the basis of extensive reflection. Accordingly, the decision-maker is particularly aware of his or her freedom but also of his/her responsibility with regard to Christian doctrine as it defines the human being.

The question is what alternative ways are there to apprehend and utilise the described empirical insights into decision-making in order to provide an adequate link? Obviously, public religious education needs to find access to the social sphere – in this particular case to aspects of business and decision-making in the commercial world – in a different form so that it can function as this link.

First and foremost public religious education needs to identify the corresponding *pressure points*. If we take for example a closer look at the quite substantial contradictions that were identified in connection with the research, we obtain pretty informative insights into economic anthropology that may not be so obvious at first sight. With regard to business-related decision-making theory, it might seem at first sight as if the construct of a strictly rational agent (‘homo economicus’) has been abandoned in favour of a more realistic model of human behaviour. But as a matter of fact the opposite is true – at least when it comes to the reception and impact of the work of Kahnemann and Tversky. If we consider the Prospect Theory, we will see that in the end all findings and calculations serve one specific purpose, this being to counterbalance faulty (note the use of the term ‘biased’) human behaviour that does not meet the requirements of a system that is still based on the idea of pure rationality.

Therefore the main emphasis of religious education in the context of promoting ‘good’ decision-making should be on the decision-makers themselves. We need to focus on aspects that are shared by economics, business and theology, on similarities and in particular on differences and contradictions because pressure points of the stated kind represent productive situations where the communication or more likely the discussion of theological ideas *really* could have an impact – and this could extend beyond mere usage of empirical insights or isolated theological advice that is not directly applicable to the specific needs of a particular target group or to actual decision-making situations.

After having identified at least one pressure point – here the specific concept of the individual as a decision-maker – we need also to pinpoint circumstances and actual situations in which it is possible to collate findings and for which educational settings and processes can be created.

In the case of the business world, situations of this kind are, for example, any working procedures that are determined by SOPs. Today almost all companies employ standard operating procedures (SOPs). These procedures represent a set of function-specific instructions (related to a particular post) and thus represent ‘ideal’ working procedures while taking into account the likelihood of process failure and providing suitable solutions. It is obvious that such mechanisms and structures have a restricting effect on individual freedom and responsibility and change the way individuals perceive the situation they are facing in the first place – and as a consequence influence how decisions are made.[[8]](#footnote-9) In addition, set working procedures of this kind make it difficult – if not impossible – to be critical and adopt the corresponding attitudes. At the same time SOPs are (at least theoretically) an ever-present reason for employees to reflect upon their roles. How far are they are trusted (or not) to work independently? Does everything make sense? And then there is the aspect of self-discipline versus outside control.

 7. The practical perspective

For the purposes of education, the processes of selection (of relevant aspects such as fundamental differences, similarities etc.), reduction (to one or more major criteria) and concretization (by means of the identification of actual situations and contents) are essentially identical to those proposed in the Elementarization Model as developed by Schweitzer and others (Schweitzer, 2007). According to this model, if communication of (theological) ideas is to be successful, it is first necessary to identify some kind of common ground where theological ideas can be associated with aspects that are fundamentally relevant to the addressee.[[9]](#footnote-10) Such common ground can be created as follows: 1) For a given topic (here: good decision-making) the initial situation is analysed (here: mutual expectations? How are decisions/the individual decision-makers perceived within the target group? What can Christian theology contribute to good decisions/decision-making? Where are there differences and overlaps, opportunities and contradictions?). 2) On basis of this analysis one (or more than one) key aspect of the topic is then selected (here: concept of the human being as a decision-maker and in particular in how far he/she is free to decide and feels accordingly responsible for his/her decisions). Note here that the selected aspects may ostensibly differ from the initial topic (right decisions in terms of what is ‘good’). But as a matter of fact there is no actual shift of topic or contradiction; instead there is emphasis on the specific perception of the topic by the addressee through the filter of the corresponding theological aspects (which does not necessarily mean affirmation of the target group’s views).[[10]](#footnote-11) 3) Concrete situations can be identified (here: working in accordance with SOPs) where the selected aspect becomes tangible and learning situations can be tailored to it. 4) The didactic approach should be defined, e.g. by choosing content, forms of interaction, methods and so on. Public religious education has the challenge of finding a form of language in which it is possible to communicate theological concepts and that is at the same time compatible with the vocabulary employed by the target group.

8. Implementation of the practical perspective

If we now draw one last time on the given example where public theology was being required to make a decision on whether to support the stock market or businesses in Frankfurt I would now – rather than taking the approach I actually did on the occasion – go for the following ‘solution’. Firstly, I would accept and make clear that what the question deals with is exclusively a matter of economics and cannot be thus be properly responded to by public theology. Instead of the concrete answer that the questioner seemed to expect, I would offer a workshop to people in key positions who have to deal in one way or another with questions of this kind. This workshop would consist of the following elements: 1) Definition and discussion (in various didactic forms) of the decision-making process, covering the empirical evidence (the Prospect Theory) as well as theological ideas on the topic (e.g. the extent to which we are free to decide by justification and bound by this fact at the same time/’freedom in responsibility’, the implications of an individual’s relationship with God, etc.). 2) This rather theoretical investigation of the topic would be followed by a palpably and emotionally challenging approach that relies strongly on personal experience and self-reflection and would make all this tangible to the individual. For this purpose, elements of bibliodrama could be employed (rather than a full bibliodrama session). Techniques such as the use of sociometric scales might make decision-makers aware – quite literally – of what their position is. Taking a stand in the face of very basic criticism (related to the circumstances of decision-making as described above) and discussion of each person’s standing with the other participants would promote self-reflection.

This could possible be followed by a short Bible session on the subject of decision-making in which the matter would be discussed from a different perspective. The text would serve as an instrument that allows participants to experimentally take up new positions and reflect upon these.[[11]](#footnote-12) 3) Finally I would make sure that every participant is given the chance to register and retain what he or she has learnt about him-/herself – how they deal with decisions that are taken by others, what upsets them or might give them consolation here and in how far this corresponds to the theoretical insights on decision-making.

If all this in the end would actually contribute to ‘good’ decision-making and would conform to what I consider to be ‘good’ is, of course, an open question. But it would at least increase awareness here to some extent and contribute to the breaking-up of routines that have become automatic in closely regulated systems so that new perspectives might be opened up. In addition, individuals might feel impelled to reflect upon their various roles as the described processes would make almost any underlying bias in the decision-making process obvious, hence they would have a need for self-justification and affirmation. Such a procedure of reflecting on the self could make motivation apparent and thus make a critical review possible. Interestingly, this corresponds closely with what Manfred Pirner has defined as the “punchline of modernisation” – namely “an increase in self-reflexivity” (Pirner, 2015, p. 316).

9. Public religious education and public theology

If public religious education is to act as a connecting factor as proposed above, what conclusions should we draw in more general terms? What would be a suitable form and how should public religious education be perceived by public theology?

Firstly, the way religious education is perceived, both internally and externally, in the context of public theology (and other related theological disciplines) must be changed. In the first place, public theology must accept that public religious education is a genuinely theological discipline and not just a vehicle for the application of theory – the scope of responsibility of religious education reaches far beyond simply developing didactic content, methods and media.

Of course to be perceived in this way from the outside requires a corresponding view to be generated from the inside, meaning that religious education has to acknowledge that there is a need for public religious education outside the school environment – which has been its main field of activity for the past decades.

Secondly, public religious education has to identify its role as a linking element and then assert itself in that role. As proposed above, public religious education would function as the link that connects a) academic theology with the corresponding non-academic institutions (for example politicians and other elements of the governance system) b) the various theological disciplines that are integrated in public theology, such as ethics, systematic theology and religious education and, last but not least, c) public theology, the corresponding institutions and (a group that has predominately been ignored so far by public theology) the specific target areas and groups of addressees. Religious education has, as its unique selling points, its subject-specific didactic expertise, theological insights and psychological skills.

Thirdly, it is necessary to define in concrete terms the tasks of public religious education as in the example above.

Finally and most importantly, actual educational programs have to be designed that make it possible to put across the ideas of public theology in real life contexts. Programs of the stated kind need to be monitored and analysed so that the new discipline of public religious education can be refined where necessary and firmly established over the long term.

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1. In Germany, there are certain institutions in the form of academies (for example in Tutzing, Frankfurt and elsewhere) that are sponsored by Christian churches and are supposed to put ideas of public theology into practice. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. Note: Christian theological ethics abstains to a large extent from deriving questions and in particular solutions from the ‘empirical bottom-line’ for such a procedure would provide for ratification rather than a critical assessment. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. For their theory, they were awarded the Nobel Prize in 2002. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. Of course, it can be disputed to what degree there are differences between trivial everyday decision-making and decision-making of great importance and scope. But even if a higher level of consciousness is assumed when the latter decisions (which often deal with ethical issues/dilemmas) are made, the identified heuristics and biases still play the underlying role. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. The concept of subjective utility replaced that of greatest economic utility in the late 1960s/early 1970s when Rational Choice Theory was first challenged, for instance by Simons et al. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. Note: The heuristics specified above are core aspects of the theory. Of course, it would be possible to discuss these in more detail but this would not be appropriate in view of the specific focus of this article. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. For example, in strategic business management or microeconomic analyses of markets and regulatory systems [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. It can be assumed that this will result in a much lower level of attentiveness while a decision-maker will probably feel less responsible for his/her decisions. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. Moreover, such an experience-based approach can be considered essential for anyone assuming responsibility for education and as a basis for the ethical aspects of teaching. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. It should also be borne in mind that greater weight should here be placed on the interests of the given target group as, in contrast to the communication of theological ideas in school, (public) theology needs to meet quite explicit expectations rather than the more generalised ones relevant to the school environment. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. For example, Noah is ordered to implement a decision taken by God (not himself) that seems rather absurd at first. It is interesting – and quite useful from the didactic point of view – that Noah does not argue, question or complain. But the perspectives of other figures can provide for additional interesting views, questions and options. These could be explored by the participants with the help of elements used in bibliodrama, such as sociometric scales, focus-specific clustering and exchange etc. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)